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Family Entrepreneurship and
Succession
A survey in province of Zhejiang
Yue Lin
1 In The Visible Hand, Alfred D. Chandler reviews the evolution of the organisation and
management of production and distribution in the United States since the industrial
revolution1.  He maintains that the modern company, as a complex organisation, has
taken the place of market mechanisms in the co-ordinating of economic activity and
allocating  resources.  To  Chandler,  the  theoretician  of  management  capitalism,  the
visible hand of the managers has replaced the invisible hand of market forces, and the
modern  company  is  characterised  by  the  establishment  of  a  hierarchy  of  salaried
cadres who are responsible for supervising and co-ordinating the work of the units that
are under their command. Many have reached the conclusion that the company based
on family capital and managed by its director-owners is an outdated form. Yet, over the
last  twenty  years,  this  supposition  has  been  widely  called  into  question  by  other
writers,  who  recognise  the  key  role  played  by  family  businesses  in  the  developed
economies.  Much  research2 shows  the  adaptability  of  this  form  of  organisation.  In
mainland China, interest in family businesses was first aroused by the success of the big
Chinese family companies which are characteristic of the countries of Southeast Asia3,
and then by the growth of the Chinese private sector, the majority of whose companies
are of the family type4.
2 Family business is not characterised by either legal forms or specific size. Some writers
choose either the criterion of ownership5, or that of management control6, in order to
describe a business as being a family one or not; other definitions are based on both
ownership and control7. Recently a dynamic approach8 has defined the family business,
whether it be a simple family workshop or a big publicly quoted company, in terms of
the  real  control  exercised  by  the  founding  family.  This  does  not  necessarily  imply
majority control of the capital or the lack of recourse to managers from outside the
family. Its distinctive trait is that no other group of shareholders carries greater weight
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than the family shareholders, and that the appointment of the head of the company
depends exclusively on the dominant shareholders.
3 Beyond  the  question  of  definition,  it  is  generally  agreed  that  a  family  business  is
characterised by the superimposition of a system of enterprise and of a family system
in one and the same entity which is both economic and social. The tangling of family
and entrepreneurial dynamics calls into question the hypothesis of a homo economicus
whose sole objective is the maximisation of his own individual interest.  The double
identity  of  the  entrepreneur  binds  his  economic  activities  tightly  to  the  family
interests.  In matters of succession, a decision is never taken as the result of purely
economic  calculation,  nor  is  it  simply  a  problem  of  the  passing  on  of  the  family
inheritance. In order to better grasp the balance of power in a family business, analysis
must be based on research in the field, with the objective of interpreting as faithfully as
possible the reality as it is perceived by the individuals themselves. In the context of a
China in transition where the power of the state mingles with individual motivations,
this  method  makes  it  possible  both  to  avoid  mistakes  that  would  lead  to
oversimplifying complexities and to shed light on the rich variety of the real lives of
individuals and organisations9.
4 The aim of this article is to contribute to the understanding of the present situation of
Chinese family businesses, through a focus on the question of succession. In the first
part,  we  introduce  a  business  that  has  experienced  two  consecutive  succession
processes  over  the  last  few  years.  From  this  we  teased  out  questions  which  are
examined  in  the  second  part,  in  the  light  of  information  gathered  from  17  family
businesses in the province of Zhejiang. 
The particular case of the Zhengyuan company
5  The story of the Zhengyuan company is closely tied to that of its founder, You Xiaohui,
formerly the director of a state enterprise (the electronic ceramics factory in Jiaxin)
and secretary of the enterprise's Party Committee. In April 1993, at the age of 61, he
retired and began a second career in Shenzhen. He borrowed 80,000 yuan and became a
sales representative for a locality and enterprise at Wuxi. In 1994, he set up his own
company, Zhengyuan, with an initial investment of 100,000 yuan, which produced a
component  for  mobile  telephones.  The  company was  registered  at  the  Chamber  of
Commerce  and  Industry  as  a  collective  enterprise10.  From  the  outset,  despite  this
official status, Zhengyuan was de facto a private company owned and managed by the
You family. All the management jobs were held by members of the family or by close
friends.  In  1996,  Zhengyuan  relinquished  its  status  as  a  collective  enterprise  and
became a public limited company (youxian zeren gongsi) with private capital. In 1999,
in  accordance  with  company  law11,  Zhengyuan  was  restructured  and  established  a
board of directors and a supervisory board. In 2000, it became a shareholding company
(gufen youxian gongsi).  In  2001,  Zhengyuan opened its  capital  to  four  institutional
shareholders, to the tune of 19.5 million yuan, and then prepared its application for a
listing on the stock market. In 2002, the company had total capital of 120 million yuan,
an  annual  turnover  of  78  million  and  profits  of  11  million.  It  employs  close  to  a
thousand employees.
The founder's family
6 You Xiaohui set up his company at the age of 61 and gave up direct management of it
four years later. When asked about his ambitions for Zhengyuan, his first wish was that
the  company  maintain  its  technological  lead  over  its  competitors,  develop  itself
Family Entrepreneurship and Succession
China Perspectives, 66 | July- August 2006
2
sustainably and contribute to local development. These ambitions are evidence that,
apart  from the  creation of  personal  and family  wealth,  self-realisation12 is  a  major
factor  in  his  entrepreneurial  motivation.  You  Xiaohui  is one  of  those  private
entrepreneurs who previously had been cadres in state enterprises. He belongs to the
professional elites who made a good living before, and who set up private companies in
the  same  sector  as  that  in  which  they  were  employed  by  the  state.  They  are
differentiated from entrepreneurs driven by poverty13, because of their relatively high
incomes14. Their professional experience sets them apart from the administrative elites
who  went  into  business  in  order  to  capitalise  on  their  power  at  the  time  of  the
transition from the planned system to the market system15. You Xiaohui thus belongs
to the group of private entrepreneurs who most closely resemble the Schumpeterian
entrepreneur16.  They  often  have  a  long-term  strategy  which  gives  priority  to  the
growth of the company.
7 You Xiaohui has three children: You Yuan (43), his elder son, You Qi (41), his younger
son, and his daughter, You Qian (34). You Yuan, who graduated from university in 1982,
initially  looked  after  the  maintenance  of  the  equipment  in  a  state  enterprise,  the
electric  controls  factory in Jiaxin.  In 1993,  he left  the company to go into his  own
electronic equipment business. In 1994, he joined Zhengyuan and became responsible
for product design. The same year, You Qi came into the family business with the job of
supervising the establishment of the factory. You Qian, who previously worked in a
public bank, recently resigned in order to join Zhengyuan. At the time of our research,
You  Xiaohui  was  president  of  the  supervisory  board,  You  Yuan  and  You  Qi  were
respectively president and vice-president of the board of directors, and You Qian was
preparing the enterprise's listing on the stock market.
Two transfers of power
8 Over  the  course  of  the  last  ten years,  Zhengyuan has  experienced two consecutive
succession processes. The first chief executive officer of Zhengyuan was You Xiaohui.
The job of president of the board at that time was held by his wife. From 1998 onwards,
You Xiaohui began the transfer of power to the second generation, appointing his elder
son, You Yuan, chief executive officer, and taking over the job of president of the board
from  his  wife.  The  succession  process  was  completed  in  1999  when  You  Xiaohui
resigned the presidency of  the board,  which he entrusted to You Yuan.  This initial
succession was carried out by the founder You Xiaohui, who decided to give up the
direct management because of his age and the inadequacy of his knowledge in the face
of rapid technological developments.
9 The second succession was made necessary by the company's expansion strategy. In
2001,  after  the  modification  of  the  company's  legal  status,  when  it  became  a
shareholding company, its development led it to take on “risk capital” to the tune of
19.5 million yuan, and to prepare a request for a listing on the stock market. In order to
comply with the criteria of the Chinese Securities Regulation Commission (Zhongguo
zhengquan jiandu guanli weiyuanhui)17, the company decided to separate the positions
held by You Yuan. In order to do this it recruited an outside professional manager, Mr.
Cai, who became chief executive officer.
10 The first transfer of power was a result of the retirement of the head of the company
because of  his  age.  If  we consider that  the main task of  a  family running a  family
business  is  to  produce  managers  with  the  necessary  competencies  (knowledge  and
experience), the interval between two transfers of power within the family will be at
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least twenty-five years in the case of a nuclear family. This interval can be shorter in
the case of an extended family, which has the possibility of absorbing sons-in-law or
cousins into the company. Thus the structure of the family (the number of children, the
availability  and motivation of  potential  successors,  etc)  influences the frequency of
successions.
11 Factors  external  to  the  company  also  come into  the  calculation.  The  technological
environment  demands  the  renewal  of  competencies  in  order  to  adapt  to  sectoral
evolution.  The  evolution  of  the  capital  structure  can  expose  the  company  to  new
shareholders.  These  factors  can  contribute  to  the  renewal  of  the  leadership  of  the
company, even if they do not contribute directly to the appointment of the successor.
12 Even after the arrival of a chief executive officer who was not part of the family circle,
the You family, at the time of our interview with You Xiaohui, still held 53% of the
shares,  while four financial  institutions held 34%, and the other directors 13%. The
management team is currently made up of 11 people, of whom three are members of
the You family (You Xiaohui and his two sons). Three are former company cadres who
now oversee general business, finance and technology. As well as the chief executive
officer, three deputy directors have been recruited from outside the company, and an
advisory post has been entrusted to a former state employee, who was previously the
head of the provincial commission for foreign economic and commercial relations (see
Graph 1). Although this evolution has led to a decrease in the control of the founding
family, the You family still holds a majority of the capital.
 
1. Present Organisation of the ZHengyuan Company
What are the criteria for choosing a successor ?
13 A natural succession linked to the age of individuals is at variance with a succession
brought about by the development of the company. The choice of the founder's eldest
son differs from the recruitment of a professional from outside the family. Is such a
development evidence of a radical change in the criteria used by You Xiaohui in the
choice  of  his  successor18 ?  During our  interview You Xiaohui  described the desired
career profile in the following terms: a competent person with professional experience
and a wide network of social contacts. When we asked him to assess the advantages and
disadvantages of different modes of selecting a successor (see Table 2), he expressed
the opinion that the introduction into the company of a professional manager favoured
the strengthening of management and innovation potential;  the disadvantage was a
lack  of  knowledge  of  the  moral  virtues  and  the  real  competence  of  the  person
concerned.  However  if  the  favoured  successor  was  already  a  company  cadre,  You
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Xiaohui would be more certain,  thanks to direct knowledge of the competence and
moral  qualities  of  the  person;  the  danger  was  of  provoking  conflict  and  slowing
innovation.  To  him,  choosing  a  relation  was  a  guarantee  of  loyalty  and  easy
communication.
14 The  essential  problem  of  a  succession  is  the  assessment  of  the  credibility  of  the
successor, who is asked to provide management competence, but also certain moral
values and action taken in accordance with the family interest. The way in which these
qualities is assessed is therefore important. In the case of Zhengyuan, You Xiaohui, the
founder,  first  chose  his  eldest  son,  You  Yuan.  A  university  graduate,  initially
responsible  for  product  development,  he  participated  in  the  foundation  of  the
company. His competence is recognised by his family and by the employees. As You
Xiaohui sees it, You Yuan is the answer to his expectations: he has the ability to commit
himself, loyalty to the family's interests and mastery of the necessary technical and
management  knowledge.  The family  connection is  not  the  ultimate  reason for  You
Xiaohui's choice, but it allowed him to observe him closely, to assess him and even to
train him. In this sense, the presence of an ideal successor within the family is the
reason rather than the result of You Xiaohui's decision to turn over power only four
years after the establishment of the company.
15 While the first succession was a strategic move undertaken by the founder, the second
succession was prompted by outside forces. In the wake of its change of status in 2000,
Zhengyuan took on board new investors from outside. The decision to seek a listing on
the stock market led You Yuan to separate the two posts he held, even though this
separation  was  not  mandatory.  This  unexpected  development  did  not  allow  You
Xiaohui easily to observe, assess or train a new successor within the family. The need to
designate  a  successor  once  again  arose  at  a  time  when  there  was  no  potentially
competent person available within the family.  You Xiaohui thus found himself  in a
dilemma19:  the designation of  an incompetent relative threatens the survival  of  the
company, while the recruitment of a manager outside the family increases the risk of
disappropriation,  especially  in  the  absence  of  a  legal  system  capable  of  settling
potential conflicts. In the end, You Xiaohui chose Cai, who had worked for several years
in Hong Kong and was previously the director of a state enterprise in Shenzhen. The
two men had met in 2000, in the course of business negotiations, and became friends. In
2002, Cai resigned from his company for personal reasons. You Xiaohui then invited
him to work at Zhengyuan. Despite other offers from big companies, Cai accepted You's
invitation because of their friendly relationship. Cai's professional experience in the
sector testified to his competence, which was also confirmed by You Xiaohui's direct
observation in their formal and informal relationship. However, just as descendance
did  not  guarantee  that  You  Yuan  would  automatically  become  the  successor,  Cai's
professional  competence  was  not  enough  to  convince  You  Xiaohui  to  place
administrative power in outside hands.  Mutual  trust,  the result  of  a  close personal
relationship, played an important role in controlling the risk of disappropriation and
allowed You to resolve the dilemma of his succession. The second succession, although
carried through outside the family, is still intuitu personae.
16 Thus  professional  competence  and  personal  qualities  are  complementary.  While
confidence  in  a  person's  ability  to  correctly  manage  the  family  patrimony  can  be
established on the basis of indirect information such as reputation, qualifications and
professional experience, information on personal qualities is more difficult to obtain.
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Moreover, the uncertainty produced by the imbalance in the available information is
increased  when  the  legal  system  is  unable  to  punish  opportunistic  behaviour
effectively. In this sense, the trust born of personal relationships largely determines
the choice of a successor. But the importance given to personal relationships does not
mean that an entrepreneur will have blind faith in his children and an absolute distrust
of  strangers.  Trust  is  a  subjective  judgement,  but  it  is  not  immune to  reason.  The
criteria used by You Xiaohui first to choose You Yuan and then Cai are of three kinds:
competence, moral qualities and a promise to act according to the family interest. Yuo
Yuan's only advantage in comparison with Cai is that he had an intimate relationship
with his father since birth, while Cai had to build a relationship with You Xiaohui in
order to establish mutual trust. Trust, based on a long relationship, is also a sign of the
dynamic nature of  a  family  enterprise  which can bring in people  from outside the
family.
 
2. You Xiaohui’s Perspective on the Choice of a Successor
17 In China, the development of the private sector goes back less than twenty years, most
businesses are family ones and are always run by their founders. The two successions
observed  in  the  case  of  the  Zhengyuan  company  prompted  us  to  formulate  the
following questions:
18 Is the recruitment of talent from outside the family merely an illusion in the case of
China ?
19 Will the growth of companies lead to the opening up of their capital and what effect
will this have on the succession process ?
20 Is the taking into consideration by a family entrepreneur of the loyalty, the spirit of
commitment  and  the  professional  competence  of  his  successor  a  widespread
phenomenon ?
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21 Is it absolutely necessary for a manager recruited from outside the family to establish
personal relationships with the executives of the company which recruits him ?
The survey
22 In order to find answers to these questions, and in collaboration with the Centre for
Research into Family Enterprise at the University of Zhejiang20, we conducted a survey
of  a  sample  of  17  family  businesses,  between  June  and  September  2005.  These
businesses share the following characteristics: their capital is private; they are large
companies21 determined  to  professionalise  their  executive  team;  the  head  of  the
company is around fifty or sixty years old, so that succession is not far off; they are
manufacturing companies.
23 During the survey, we made two unexpected discoveries. We had initially believed that
a number of private companies, after over twenty years of growth, were in the process
of transferring power from one generation to another or had already experienced a
transfer of power. In reality, for a majority of private companies, succession is not an
essential  preoccupation  because  of  the  youth  of  both  the  entrepreneur  and  the
company22. Among the seventeen companies, only two had had a change of principal
manager, nine had not been confronted with the question of succession, and six did not
give any answers. Thus our survey, which had anticipated the observation of practices,
reveals only opinions on the question of succession. Secondly, we initially sought to
meet with twenty large private companies in the same sector in Wenzhou,  but the
preponderance of small and medium-size private companies only made it possible for
us  to  identify  13  companies  in  the  area,  to  which  we  later  added  four  companies
situated in the environs of Hangzhou (two in Jiaxin, two in Tonglu).
24 These 17 companies are family businesses in the strict sense because of the dominant
presence of the founding family in their capital: 44.18% of the shares belong to the chief
executive officers and 41.94% of the shares are held by other members of the founding
family (see Table 3).  The chief executive officer is the majority shareholder in nine
cases, while the other members of the founding family hold the majority of the capital
in the other eight companies. As the chief executive officer is, most often, also the head
of the family, the founding families control these companies.
 
3. Shareholding
25 From  the  management  point  of  view,  executive  functions  are  carried  out  by  the
founders (in 40.5% of cases) and their children (13.8%), for a total of 54.3% of positions
(see Table 4). Family control at executive level is evident, even if it does not preclude
Family Entrepreneurship and Succession
China Perspectives, 66 | July- August 2006
7
the arrival of outside talent (25% of executives are professional managers recruited
from  outside).  The  data  collected  on  the  capital,  the  turnover  and  the  number  of
employees shows that these are large companies (see Table 5).
 
4. Excecutive
 
5. Size of Companies in our Survey
The reasons for succession
26 At the time of our survey, the majority of family businesses were still under the control
of their founder. 88.2% of the founders were aged between 40 and 50. The transfer of
power between generations is therefore not yet a major preoccupation. However, 82.4%
of the founders (14 out of 17) admitted that they have already begun to look for their
successors. When asked for their reasons, only nine companies expressed an answer
(see Table 6).
 
6. The reasons for succession
27 The main reason is  linked to  the founder himself.  The physical  decline due to  age
(28.9%) is the major reason, while a recognition of the limitations of his competence in
the face of technical evolution ranks second (28.3%)23. Some also refer to the external
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environment in a situation where growth no longer allows the founder,  despite his
competence, to control his company alone. A lack of management capability within the
company obliges him to consider a transfer of power (5.9%). Lastly, outside investors
may  demand a  change  of  leadership,  but  the  influence  they  exert  remains  limited
(5.9%). The reason may lie in the closed nature of the capital: the family businesses in
this survey mainly rely on self-financing (90%) or on bank loans (69.4%) for finance24.
Whatever the reasons for this25, the closed nature of the capital of these companies and
the very limited impact of outside investors on the choice of chief executive, lead us to
believe that the Zhengyuan company is a very particular case. Its decision to seek a
stock market listing must be seen as an evolution in the personal preferences of certain
members  of  the  family.  In  other  words,  the  choice  of  certain  family  businesses  to
become bigger and more “modern”, with the help of the financial markets, is more the
result  of  particular  personal  decisions  than  a  law  of  the  development  of  family
businesses26.
28 Thus,  the  physical  decline  of  the  founder  and  the  evolution  in  the  technical
environment are the two main factors that lead to succession taking place, while the
direct pressure exerted by outside investors is marginal. The role played by the second
generation at this stage of the succession must also be noted. To the question “Do your
children wish to work and progress in your company?”, 76.5% of the founders give a
positive reply, but none of them envisage giving up their power only because of their
children's desire to participate more in the business.
The criteria for choosing a successor
29 Although  the  children's  desire  to  share  power  with  their  parents  does  not
automatically allow them to succeed to the job of chief executive, 88.2% of founders
want their children to be able to work in the company. This apparent contradiction
demonstrates the complexity of the criteria that apply in the choice of a successor. In
order to identify them, three categories of qualities were listed in the questionnaire.
We  asked  the  founders  to  list  them  in  declining  order  of  importance,  and  then
calculated their respective levels of importance (see Table 7)27.
30 Loyalty (50.4%), leadership ability (50%) and the spirit of commitment (43.8%) are the
most appreciated qualities. Experience (26.1%) and university training ((19.5%) are also
deemed important. Also mentioned is the network of professional contacts (15.8%). If
one compares the level of importance of the three categories, “character traits” come
first (28.8%), “abilities” follow (at 17.5%), while “other qualities” come last (2.6%). In
the choice of a successor, moral qualities and technical competence are the two main
criteria taken into account by the founders. However, morality seems more important
than competence in the eyes of the majority of founders28.
31 The importance given to loyalty and competence is differentiated according to the kind
of responsibility taken on. Where the post of chief executive, the most important in
day-to-day management, is concerned, opportunistic behaviour is the most harmful to
the interests of the family. Where the manager's loyalty and spirit of commitment are
the most important criteria,  the selection of a successor always remains subjective,
despite the objective aspect of  the selection procedure which is  partly based on an
assessment  of  competence  through  university  training  and  acquired  experience.
Similar assessments are made in other parts of the world. Both in developed countries,
such  as  Canada,  and  developing  countries,  such  as  India,  loyalty  and  the  spirit  of
commitment are deemed to be the most important qualities by company heads29.
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7. Qualities demanded of a successor
32 Thus the challenge facing a chief executive is to assess credibility and to measure the
moral  risks  ex  poste.  In  contemporary  China,  institutional  trust30 is  deemed  to  be
insufficient  because  of  the  low power  of  constraint  of  the  institutional  framework.
Trust intuitu personae and relationship trust31 are the two main forms of trust which
the Chinese establish in economic and social life. When formal structures do not make
it possible to produce “calculable trust” resulting from a rational calculation, which
consists of accurately predicting the behaviour of others through the constraints of the
situation, trust “only begins, can only be measured and is only consistent in lasting
social relationships”32.  “The social connection network is the organising principle in
Chinese companies”33.
33 Trust is a continuous process that evolves along with the behaviour of the players, the
stakes, their power and the emergence of new rationalities34.  The complexity of the
information  obtained  by  an  employer  is  thus  a  function  of  personal  relationships.
Resorting to members of the family during the development phase of a company is thus
the  result  of  a  “stronger  trust  between family  members  than  between commercial
partners”35. The founder of an enterprise has at his disposal more information about
the members of his family than about the employees he has already recruited, and,
even more so, than about someone from outside.
34 Table 8 examines the advantages and disadvantages of choosing a successor by taking
into account the degree of “proximity”. Family entrepreneurs share a common vision
of  the  various  means  of  recruitment.  They  believe  that  the  main  advantage  of
recruiting  a  professional  manager  is  that  it  favours  innovation,  while  the  main
disadvantage lies in the uncertainty about the person’s loyalty and honesty. Internal
promotion and recruiting a family member for succession favour the continuity of the
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company culture, making it possible for the founder to reduce the risk of recruiting a
person with weaker moral values than hoped for. However, internal recruitment may
slow innovation and the reforms necessary in order to adapt to technical evolution.
The loyalty of relations is recognised by most founders as being the highest (61.3%).
 
8.Advantages and Disadvantages of the Ways of Selecting a Successor
35 Consequently, the ideal successor in the eyes of a founder is a relation who is both
motivated and competent. This is borne out by our observation, since the majority of
those questioned during our survey explicitly stated that the best solution is to pass
power on to the descendants who have already proved their professional competence
and their spirit of commitment. Problems arise when the ideal candidate is unavailable
and when professional competence is the key to the success of the company. The means
on which the founders rely in order to check the moral aspect of candidates, if the
designated  successor  is  not  a  relation,  are  not  clear.  Nevertheless,  our  hypothesis
according to which personal relationships constitute an informal way of checking the
reliability of a successor, is partially justified by the results of the surveys carried out
by other researchers.  Li  Guoqing has shown that 45% of chief executives are either
relations  (42%)  or  friends  (3%)  of  the  chief  executive,  25%  are  cadres  recruited
internally, while only 16% are directly recruited on the job market36.
36 Beyond the case of the Zhengyuan company, the survey carried out reveals that in
Chinese family businesses, the reasons for succession, the criteria of selection of the
successor and the order of preference among the various candidates all conform with
practices  in  other  parts  of  the  world.  In  the  course  of  the  development  of  their
enterprise, the founders do not hesitate to entrust functional jobs to competent third
parties who are not members of the family circle. However, it is to be expected that the
succession to the job of chief executive officer will usually be the result of the natural
retirement  of  the  head  of  the  company.  Anxious  to  preserve  his  patrimony,  an
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entrepreneur in China, as elsewhere, while taking into account technical competence
and management abilities, assesses above all the honesty and loyalty of his potential
successor. Trust, in the widest sense of the word, is a decisive factor. Consequently, the
entrepreneur prefers to designate a competent member of his family.
37 It  is  when  such  a  successor  is  not  available  at  the  time  of  succession  that  the
particularity  of  China's  case  becomes  more  marked;  this  is  not  linked  to  cultural
specificities, but to the institutional context37. The underdeveloped state of institutions
and the destruction of traditional social organisation38 limit the role of institutional
trust in economic co-operation. In contemporary China, trust is usually produced by
personal relationships. Social networks are brought into action in order to control the
risks in the face of uncertainty39. The case of the Zhengyuan company and the opinions
we have gathered show the entrepreneur resorting to  his  network of  relationships
when  his  successor  is  being  chosen.  Depending  on  the  degree  of  intimacy  of  the
relationship, he first seeks a candidate among “the members of his family” then among
“those close to him”, and may finally resort to “strangers”. The wide-ranging definition
of zijiren, which includes all those deemed reliable and sharing common values, makes
it possible for a family business to escape the dilemma of succession and to develop
even if there is a lack of available professional managers. The survey did not make it
possible to answer all the questions arising from the case of the Zhengyuan company.
Our  sample  was  limited,  and  could  not  determine  how  representative  it  is  of  the
majority  of  private  companies,  which  in  reality  are  small  in  size.  Moreover,  the
question of succession remains open. Further surveys will  provide wider knowledge
and understanding of this area of business in China.
38 Translated from the French original by Michael Black
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RÉSUMÉS
In mainland China, the family, as the basic social unit, has recently regained its importance in
economic activity.  Starting from the particular  case of  a  family  business  located in Zhejiang
province, this article reviews the practices that prevail in the succession of the management of
companies. Following this case study, a questionnaire was drawn up and submitted to 17 family
businesses. The criteria applied by the entrepreneur in the choice of his/her successor, the order
of  preference  among  the  candidates,  and  the  methods  of  controlling  the  risks  involved  are
revealed and analysed.
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